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Abstract 1 
Studying social modulation of cognitive processes holds much promise for illuminating how, 2 
where, when and why social factors influence how we perceive and act in the world, as well 3 
as providing insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This is no small objective; it 4 
reflects an ambitious programme of research. At present, based on the modal theoretical 5 
and methodological approach, we suggest that several challenges exist to achieving such 6 
lofty aims. These challenges span an overreliance on a simplistic dichotomy between “top-7 
down” and “bottom-up” modulation, a lack of specificity about mechanisms that renders 8 
clear interpretations difficult, and theories that largely test against null hypotheses. We 9 
suggest that these challenges present several opportunities for new research and we 10 
encourage the field to abandon simplistic dichotomies and connect much more with existing 11 
research programmes such as semantics, memory and attention, which have all built diverse 12 
research platforms over many decades and that can help shape how social modulation is 13 
conceptualised and studied from a cognitive and brain perspective. We also outline ways 14 
that stronger theoretical positions can be taken, which avoid comparing to null hypotheses, 15 
and endorse methodological reform through fully embracing proposals from the open 16 
science movement and “credibility revolution”. We feel that by taking these opportunities, 17 
the field will have a better chance of reaching its potential to build a cumulative science of 18 
social modulation that can inform understanding of basic cognitive and brain systems, as 19 
well as real-life social interactions and the varied abilities observed across the Autism 20 
Spectrum.  21 
 3 
1. Introduction 1 
The idea that what you know influences what you see is not a new one. Indeed, perceptual 2 
input is rarely completely encapsulated from other pieces of knowledge or information. 3 
While perception is driven "bottom-up" by stimulus features such as object shape, size, and 4 
position, perceptions are also influenced from "top-down" by our knowledge of the world. A 5 
well-known example is the word superiority effect (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981), showing 6 
that knowledge of words affects perceptions of letters. Our understanding of human 7 
perception cannot be complete, therefore, without appreciating how the broader mental 8 
context -- including thoughts, beliefs, desires, and expectations, amongst many other factors 9 
-- shapes cognitive processes.  10 
Turning to the present focus, top-down and bottom-up influences have also been 11 
investigated in social domains – situations that involve interactions between people (for 12 
reviews, see Bach & Schenke, 2017; Otten, Seth, & Pinto, 2017; Zeki, 2013). Social 13 
information has been shown to modulate how we perceive and judge other people, as well 14 
as how we act towards them (Otten et al., 2013). In addition, researchers have started to 15 
study the factors that modulate the links between perception and action; situations where 16 
visual and motor processes are processed in parallel or integrated somehow, such as during 17 
imitation and action observation. Indeed, research has investigated how social factors such 18 
as motives, group membership, context, prior experience and beliefs can have a top-down 19 
influence on the links between perception and action (for reviews, see Arnold & 20 
Winkielman, 2019; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Campbell & Cunnington, 2017; Chartrand & Lakin, 21 
2013; Heyes, 2011; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 22 
2012). For example, imitative tendencies have been shown to be influenced by group 23 
membership (Gleibs, Wilson, Reddy, & Catmur, 2016; Rauchbauer, Majdandžić, Stieger, & 24 
Lamm, 2016), beliefs about animacy (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Klapper, Ramsey, Wigboldus, & 25 
Cross, 2014), as well as pro-social primes and gestures (Cook & Bird, 2011; Cracco, 26 
Genschow, Radkova, & Brass, 2018; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 27 
2013). To date, therefore, a diverse set of top-down factors have been associated with social 28 
modulation and they have been studied across a number of perception and action 29 
processes.  30 
As the examples above demonstrate, social modulation has come to encompass a 31 
wide range of influences. Indeed, as we unpack in the next sections, the term has a rather 32 
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diffuse meaning at present, which is likely to hamper progress. Nonetheless, even with a 1 
loosely-defined term, contributions have been made to understanding perception-action 2 
links via the investigation of top-down modulation. One piece of added value, for example, is 3 
support for the idea that social cognition, as well as cognition more generally, cannot be 4 
understood by only studying component processes in isolation (Churchland, 2013). The 5 
complexity of social life and related cognition is reliant upon the interaction of many 6 
different mental processes (Adolphs, 2010; Frith & Frith, 2012), which requires the study of 7 
how signals are integrated within and between processors (Park & Friston, 2013; Bullmore & 8 
Sporns, 2009). Therefore, aiming to understand the relationship between social factors and 9 
links between perception and action has an intuitive appeal that goes beyond the narrow 10 
study of the specifics in question, and generalises to understanding basic processes of 11 
human cognition and brain function.  12 
On this analysis, it seems logical and reasonable that social top-down modulation 13 
research has garnered broad appeal from researchers in many different aspects of 14 
psychology and neuroscience (e.g., Bach & Schenke, 2017; Otten, Seth, & Pinto, 2017; Wang 15 
& Hamilton, 2012; Zaki, 2013), as well as those in clinical and health disciplines who study 16 
atypical social information processing, such as Autism Spectrum Conditions (e.g., Cook, 17 
Barbalat & Blakemore, 2012). Although we feel the current approach has potential to be 18 
relevant and important across multiple disciplines, the research programme is in the early 19 
stages of development and like any new direction of research it is having teething problems. 20 
Indeed, we would argue that it is still finding its feet in terms of understanding its aims and 21 
tying those to relevant and rigorous theoretical positions and methodological approaches.  22 
In light of this present context, therefore, in the current paper we aim to present 23 
challenges and opportunities for social top-down modulation research that study 24 
perception-action links (see Table 1). Although our present focus is on understanding links 25 
between perception and action, the set of challenges and opportunities we present are 26 
applicable to top-down modulation research in psychology more generally. As such, the 27 
general arguments that we present apply equally to studies of social perception and 28 
behaviour. We suggest that the most common approaches suffer from several theoretical 29 
and methodological limitations, which make it unclear what claims, exactly, are being 30 
supported by the evidence provided. These range from ambiguity over what social top-down 31 
modulation is and is not, a lack of specificity in the claims being made and a predominance 32 
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of theoretical positions based on null-hypothesis testing. We outline how and why these 1 
present non-trivial challenges to firmer progress. We then put forward several opportunities 2 
for future research that we feel will help to overcome these limitations and push the 3 
research programme further in the future.4 
 6 
Table 1. Challenges and opportunities for social modulation research in cognitive psychology. 
Note: The “crud” factor refers to the notion that to some degree everything is related to everything in psychology. As such, small, non-zero 
effects are difficult to interpret on their own because they could reflect complex, multivariate and non-theorised relationships (Meehl, 1990; 
Orben & Lakens, 2019). See section 2.3 of the main text for further details.
Challenge 1 Challenge 2 Challenge 3
Description Social top-down modulation 
needs a clearer definition
Specificity over mechanisms 
needs establishing
Theoretical and methodological 
reform is required
Example/s - A neat dichotomy between 
“top-down” and “bottom-up” is 
unrealistic and hinders progress
- “Social modulation” captures so 
many factors that we question its 
utility
- Mechanism vs. 
stimulus/context specificity is 
unclear 
- Research aims are unclear (e.g., 
basic systems vs. real-life 
relevance), which makes 
interpretation of effects difficult
- Testing against the null 
hypothesis of no modulation 
dominates and the “crud” factor 
is a concern
- Levels of reproducibility and 
power are low or not yet 
demonstrated
Opportunity 1 Opportunity 2 Opportunity 3
Description Replace and avoid unrealistically 
neat divisions and umbrella 
terms
Benefit more from established 
research programmes
Improve theoretical reasoning 
and embrace methodological 
reform
Example/s - Describe social factors in 
concrete and specific terms
- Place firmer constraints on 
generality
- Domain-general knowledge 
from established literatures (e.g., 
semantic, memory, attention, 
and biased competition) are 
directly relevant and can inform 
the research programme
- Test alternative theories and 
predictions beyond the null
- Use theory mapping tools
- Embrace the “credibility 
revolution”
 7 
2. Challenges 1 
 2 
2.1 Social top-down modulation needs a clearer definition.  3 
 4 
We find the "social" and the "top-down" part of this terminology a hindrance to the 5 
development of the research programme. In the "social" domain, “top-down” currently 6 
appears to encompass a broad swathe of factors that could modulate behaviour in many 7 
different ways and be supported by many different cognitive and neurobiological 8 
mechanisms. Rather than representing a minor quibble over the specifics of a definition, we 9 
see the current dichotomic foundational structure as a major challenge to progress for 10 
several reasons.  11 
First, at a basic level, it is not entirely clear what counts as top-down. Is it all non-12 
stimulus-driven effects? If so, what constitutes "stimulus-driven" needs defining, and clear 13 
boundaries between the two types of modulation need setting. However, our view is that a 14 
neat division between top-down and bottom-up is likely to be overly simplistic and 15 
unrealistic. Real-life encounters frequently comprise a combination of factors, and while 16 
some would typically be “top-down” and others “bottom-up”, often it might be impossible 17 
to tell. You are waiting for a train and you see a work colleague. What happens next 18 
percolates from a complex brew of tonic top-down goals (e.g., get along with colleagues; 19 
advance within the workplace; self-promote; avoid conflict) and bottom-up stimulus 20 
activation (e.g., who exactly is this colleague?; what interactions have you had with them 21 
recently?; what emotional states, if any, does this colleague trigger?). If you were then polite 22 
but non-committal to this colleague, would that be a top-down or bottom-up effect?  23 
To answer this question, one could imagine holding the task context constant 24 
(waiting for the train), and varying the stimulus factor (the colleague). But this cannot be a 25 
complete solution, as in real-world cases, stimulus-driven activity and rich associations 26 
between stimuli can lead to implicit task goals; that is, a "top-down" task set could be 27 
activated through "bottom-up" stimulus processing. For example, the associations activated 28 
from one colleague might in turn activate an implicit goal to approach; sight of a different 29 
colleague might lead to the activation of an avoidance goal. Therefore, a framework for 30 
studying integration and combination of factors is required. This is not to suggest that 31 
manipulating one factor and holding others constant is not an eminently sensible approach 32 
 8 
to scientific experimentation. Rather, it is to suggest that only attempting to understand 1 
processes by studying them in isolation is fundamentally limited. Instead, processes must be 2 
studied in isolation and in combination to more completely understand how they operate, as 3 
well as approximate their function in real life. In other words, we should estimate the degree 4 
of cognition that results from interaction between systems, such as between processors in 5 
the ventral visual stream and the theory of mind network (e.g., Ramsey, 2018a), as well as 6 
the degree that results from largely localised processing within each of these systems (e.g., 7 
Kanwisher, 2010). 8 
Second, the same term or variants of “social modulation” are used to cover so many 9 
different social factors, which span motives, beliefs, group features and social context (e.g., 10 
competitive vs. cooperative), that we question its practical value. Indeed, if we stopped 11 
using this umbrella term completely, would we lose anything at all? Under the assumption 12 
that social signals of all kinds could modulate behaviour, could researchers, for example, just 13 
use a more descriptive term to describe the specific social factor of interest, such as a level 14 
of perceived attractiveness, group features or the aspect of the environmental context that 15 
has been manipulated? In fact, rather than losing anything, we may actually gain some 16 
precision by doing so. That is because, until we know otherwise, it is reasonable to suppose 17 
that different social factors may exert influence on perception and action by different 18 
mechanisms. For example, the influence of attractiveness on approach and avoidance 19 
behaviours (Kramer et al., 2020) might arise through very different mechanisms than the 20 
influence of pro- and anti-social interactions on imitation (Wang & Hamilton, 2012; 2013).  21 
For these reasons, like others in more general forms of psychology (Awh, Belopolsky, 22 
& Theeuwes, 2012), we suggest that researchers should consider using more specific 23 
frameworks to guide the study of social modulations and biases (see Opportunity 1 below).  24 
 25 
2.2 Specificity needs demonstrating. 26 
 27 
A higher degree of specificity is required when making claims regarding top-down control in 28 
relation to the evidence. One pervasive issue concerns stimulus versus mechanism 29 
specificity (Adolphs, 2009). Is modulation specific to a social stimulus or does it reflect a 30 
more general process? This question does not raise doubt over the social stimulus being 31 
social. A face, a group of friends, or a dislike for someone who enters the room, is usually 32 
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unambiguously person-related and social. Instead, it raises the possibility that the underlying 1 
mechanism that biases behaviour is squarely, or at least predominantly, domain-general and 2 
operates across all contexts to some extent including social settings. If we found that a social 3 
stimulus influenced perception-action links, that does not imply that domain-specific social 4 
cognition had any effect (Ramsey & Ward, in press). An experiment which uses only social 5 
stimuli to show social modulation is susceptible to this argument. For example, visual stimuli 6 
of fingers being raised produce congruency effects on finger-raising responses (Brass, 7 
Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000), but this does not necessarily imply a social process 8 
of imitation has been demonstrated (Ramsey, 2018b; Ramsey & Ward, in press). It implies 9 
that at some level, the stimulus code given to irrelevant finger stimuli overlaps with the 10 
stimulus code given to the imperative number stimulus (e.g., Hommel, 2009).  11 
As further examples, work from our own lab could be viewed differently if a stronger 12 
non-social position was taken (Klapper et al., 2014). Although the work by Klapper and 13 
colleagues (2014) demonstrates clearly that stimulus and belief cues to human animacy 14 
interact to influence behaviour in a social context, it remains unclear if such interactions are 15 
mediated through largely specialised and domain-specific mechanisms or something more 16 
general. In fact, without any specific evidence to the contrary, we now would seek to explain 17 
this effect as domain-general mechanisms of cognitive control operating over domain-18 
specific social representations (Ramsey & Ward, in press). Likewise, priming a social 19 
construct, such as helping or harming others, can affect stimulus-response compatibility 20 
measures that are purportedly associated with imitative tendencies (Wang & Hamilton, 21 
2013). The default interpretation of such findings focusses on the operation of systems 22 
dedicated to social information processing, rather than more general systems (Wang & 23 
Hamilton, 2013). Interest in highly "social" explanations, such as affiliative goal activation 24 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), motivation to create moral communities (Boehm, 2000), and 25 
active-self models, in which pro-sociality is assimilated into the sense of self (Wang & 26 
Hamilton, 2013) are understandable. These kinds of explanations tap into important ideas of 27 
the moral structure and even the evolved basis of humanity.  28 
However, given that powerful workhorses of cognition such as alerting, filtering, 29 
orienting and prioritisation are, by definition, domain-general and operating across social 30 
and non-social contexts (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Petersen & Posner, 2012; Ptak, 31 
2012; Duncan, 2010), we feel the first hurdle to address is to what extent social modulation 32 
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effects can be understood in terms of domain-general mechanisms. For example, to what 1 
extent might different kinds of prosocial priming produce an attentional bias towards human 2 
stimuli? In other words, general processes of control that operate through ventral and 3 
dorsolateral frontoparietal cortex could play a much bigger role in modulating links between 4 
perception and action than has been given credit so far (Campbell & Cunnington, 2017; 5 
Ramsey & Ward, in press). That is, when thinking about findings from social modulation 6 
studies, before considering how wide and significant are the potential implications, first 7 
consider how well-studied mechanisms such as attentional bias and shared perception-8 
action codes might explain the findings.  9 
The combined result of this lack of specificity is that the purpose and type of research 10 
being undertaken is unclear. For instance, it is unclear if research is attempting to model 11 
systems and processes to address basic understanding, or estimate effects that have 12 
practical meaning in real-life, or a combination of both aims. Both aims seem possible, but 13 
researchers should be clear on the scope of the work. Being clear on these issues matters 14 
because it directly impacts the type of interpretations that can be made on the data and 15 
how one may evaluate whether the method is appropriate for the purpose. For instance, if 16 
one is trying to draw conclusions about cognitive processes, and we know only that a social 17 
factor has influenced perception and/or action in some way and through some unknown 18 
mechanism, then the lack of mechanism-specificity blurs the interpretation of the effects. As 19 
a consequence, a higher bar needs to be set for what type of evidence demonstrates a 20 
specific claim.  21 
Top-down modulation research is not alone in having clear limits on specificity either; 22 
concerns regarding the specificity of claims being made have recently been levelled at a 23 
much more established research programme that is concerned with recognising emotions 24 
from facial movements (Barrett, Adolphs, Marsella, Martinez, & Pollak, 2019). For example, 25 
contrary to the common view in science and society, facial configurations and expressions of 26 
emotion are not uniquely linked. That is, people do not always feel unhappy when they 27 
frown or happy when they smile. Consequently, the observation of a smile alone is not 28 
diagnostic of a particular emotional state. Instead, the evidence to date suggests that there 29 
is a much coarser mapping between facial movements and emotional states, which varies 30 
substantially across people and contexts. One implication of this work is that before firm 31 
conclusions can be made about specific relationships, a higher standard of evidence is 32 
 11 
required. Another implication is that a lack of specificity is a much more general problem for 1 
cognitive psychology and it may require more general solutions (see Opportunity 2 below). 2 
 3 
2.3 Theoretical and methodological reform is required 4 
 5 
Much like psychology research in general (Meehl, 1967; Rouder et al., 2016), alternative 6 
hypotheses appear to default to a null hypothesis – i.e., no top-down modulation. This 7 
seems like a straw man hypothesis, given what we know about “lower-level” processes, such 8 
as vision, which are not completely encapsulated from the influence of other systems. For 9 
instance, neuroscience research has shown that aspects of the visual system, which process 10 
elemental visual properties, such as colour, form and motion, are influenced by systems that 11 
extend beyond the visual system (Gilbert & Li, 2013). If basic components of vision are not 12 
completely encapsulated from the operation of other systems, it seems highly unlikely that 13 
more complex processing units would be. Although the nature of information encapsulation 14 
continues to drive lively debate from a cognitive standpoint (see Firestone & Scholl, 2016 15 
plus the associated peer commentary), we find a strong version of Fodor’s module definition 16 
untenable because it relies, in part, on complete information encapsulation, amongst other 17 
things1 (Fodor, 1983). Instead, we favour a weaker form of modularity that does not require 18 
complete information encapsulation (Carruthers, 2006; Ogilvie & Carruthers, 2016). Under 19 
such a view, information processing systems are relatively specialised for particular 20 
processes, such as vision, whilst also being modifiable by other systems (Ogilvie & 21 
Carruthers, 2016). What remains, therefore, are questions regarding the extent to which 22 
processes (social or otherwise, top-down or otherwise) modulate perception-action links, in 23 
what situations and by how much?  24 
Such questions make considerations of the “crud” factor particularly relevant. The 25 
notion of the “crud” factor was developed in personality research and suggests that to some 26 
(possibly small) degree everything is related to everything, and therefore we should be 27 
especially cautious when interpreting small non-zero relationships (Meehl, 1990; Orben & 28 
Lakens, 2019). Considered in the context of the present focus, given the possibly infinite set 29 
 
1 Fodor’s (1983) definition of a module included fulfilling a range of properties, such as: domain-specificity; 
information encapsulation; obligatory firing; fast processing; shallow outputs; limited accessibility; innate; fixed 
neural architecture. 
 12 
of inter-relationships between social variables and cognitive processes, there is a huge space 1 
for small but non-zero relationships to emerge, which prevent a single straightforward 2 
interpretation. Indeed, the results could emerge from a multivariate set of complex and 3 
interrelated causal pathways, which were not considered by researchers (Orben & Lakens, 4 
2019). Here, therefore, crud factor effects are distinguished from effects that reflect 5 
sampling error or noise, which would not be replicable. Instead, crud factor effects are real 6 
in the sense that they are replicable, they are just not interpretable because they reflect 7 
complex, multivariate and non-theorised relationships (Meehl, 1990; Orben & Lakens, 2019). 8 
On this view, we should not be surprised that manipulating social variables could influence 9 
links between perception and action in some way; in fact, we should expect it. As a 10 
consequence, therefore, it seems important to go beyond a comparison to the null 11 
hypothesis and be explicit and clear regarding what alternatives are being considered 12 
(Rouder et al., 2016). Failure to do so will produce a situation that mirrors many other fields 13 
of research: given sufficient power and sensitivity, there is likely to be a non-zero 14 
relationship, but why does it matter? How big is it? Are there credible alternative theoretical 15 
positions? If not, the value of the work remains ambiguous. 16 
 A further limiting factor on the potential value of the work relates to methodological 17 
reform. Before debates run on for decades regarding social top-down modulation, the 18 
methodological and empirical bar should be adjusted and raised before strong claims can be 19 
made about specificity or any other aspect of social modulation. As pointed out in many 20 
domains of psychology, reproducibility levels are low (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), 21 
which presents a substantial roadblock to the development of a cumulative science, and we 22 
see no reason why top-down modulation research would be any different. In fact, a recent 23 
meta-analysis has shown that the influence of social factors on one purported measure of 24 
imitation is null or negligible (Cracco, Bardi et al., 2018). In addition, other studies using 25 
much larger sample sizes than the original studies have failed to replicate effects of pro-26 
social primes on imitation (Newey, Koldewyn, & Ramsey, 2019), as well as effects of 27 
emotional expressions and aspects of personality such as narcissism on imitation (Butler, 28 
Ward, & Ramsey, 2015; Darda, Butler, & Ramsey, 2019). Moreover, top-down effects are 29 
likely to be small to moderate in size, much like effects generally in psychology, which 30 
presents a substantial challenge to performing powerful research, but also an opportunity to 31 
change study designs and how one may interpret small effect sizes (see Opportunity 3).  32 
 13 
As a counter-point, however, it should be noted that a small but increasing number 1 
of studies have used more robust methods (e.g., larger sample sizes, multiple experiments, 2 
pre-registration) and show evidence for social modulation (e.g., Cracco et al., 2018; 3 
Genschow et al., 2020). Such studies are an encouraging sign for the field, although they 4 
stop short of providing evidence that the effects rely on a social or specialised mechanism. 5 
As such, it is worth stressing that estimating the presence of non-zero effects in a robust 6 
manner does not license an inference about the underlying system controlling such effects. 7 
In summary, the need to address methodological reform is clear from these examples and 8 
features as one of the main drivers of this special issue. 9 
 10 
 11 
3. Opportunities 12 
 13 
3.1 Move on from “social", "top-down”, and “bottom-up” terminology and place firmer 14 
constraints on generality. 15 
 16 
Researchers may consider avoiding and replacing terms like “top-down” and “bottom-up” 17 
(Awh et al., 2012), as they are unnecessary and uninformative under alternative frameworks 18 
(see below). Indeed, a host of cues continually fight to dominate attention with many 19 
different and varied features providing bias. And we also have a long history of prior 20 
experience to add to this picture, which shapes basic perceptual processes. The upshot is 21 
that a simple top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy may not be that useful because it is 22 
based on an over-simplification, one that mirrors suggestions in other domains of cognitive 23 
science regarding the division between automatic and controlled processes (Melnikof & 24 
Bargh, 2018). Instead, nearly every situation is a combination of bias from a range of 25 
different sources. How they mesh and compete is interesting, but we do not see how vague 26 
terms such as top-down and bottom-up remain useful.  27 
It seems simpler to state the specific form of bias – facial attractiveness, level of 28 
hunger, motivation to get fitter, addiction to smoking, rather than catch-all terms like top-29 
down and bottom-up. Without clear and specific operational definitions, the terms quickly 30 
lose their meaning, especially when there are many different flavours of what people mean 31 
by the terms (Lenartowicz, Kalar, Congdon, & Poldrack, 2010; Poldrack et al., 2011). A move 32 
 14 
towards more descriptive and concrete terminology for social factors also addresses our 1 
concerns about the utility of studying "social modulation" in an abstract sense, when 2 
different social factors may potentially influence cognition in different ways. Such a view 3 
also reinforces recent suggestions that greater progress would be made in psychology if 4 
more descriptive research was performed in general (Yarkoni, 2019), and if there was a 5 
greater willingness to consider functional research, which documents how environmental 6 
features influence behaviour, together with research that aims to understand cognitive 7 
mechanisms (Hughes, De Houwer & Perugini, 2016).  8 
To be clear, we are not arguing that no progress at all can be or has been made using 9 
such terms. Existing frameworks do exist where these terms and associated concepts are of 10 
central importance (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Bar et al., 2006; Bar, 2009; Friston, 2010; Otten, 11 
Seth, & Pinto, 2017; Zeki, 2013). On the one hand, therefore, we feel that if one wants to use 12 
these terms then it seems sensible to embed them within these existing frameworks. On the 13 
other hand, however, we offer caution in doing so. As our line of argumentation has put 14 
forward, these frameworks may serve to demonstrate that many domains of psychology and 15 
brain science may suffer from using fuzzy and overly simplified distinctions between bottom-16 
up and top-down processes. Indeed, we feel the distinction between top-down and bottom-17 
up, much like divisions between automatic versus controlled processes (Melnikof & Bargh, 18 
2018), can be easily used in non-informative ways. Therefore, the use of such terms may be 19 
a limiting factor in those frameworks also. 20 
The predominance of the distinction may hinder progress in other ways also by 21 
unnecessarily shackling the development of alternative frameworks. Other lines of research 22 
could prosper, for example, by taking a different starting point, which favours a multi-23 
dimensional approach rather than a strong reliance on specifying a neat division between 24 
top-down and bottom-up processes. Research in psychopathology, for example, has shown 25 
that there are benefits from considering questions through a dimensional rather than 26 
categorical lens (e.g., Conway et al., 2019). Under a more dimensional approach, therefore, 27 
one could expect psychological processes, including social modulation, to reflect a continual 28 
blend of multiple sources of bias that interact with each other (Zaki, 2013). Finally, it might 29 
also be worth acknowledging that simple distinctions may have more use in some domains 30 
than others. For example, it seems eminently sensible to use an established framework, such 31 
as object perception (Bar et al., 2006; Bar, 2009), as a template to help guide the study of 32 
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social perception. Whilst there appear to be clear benefits of doing so, the scope of such an 1 
approach is also likely to be limited. Indeed, such a framework may become less useful when 2 
explaining more complex phenomena, such as modulatory influences in social interactions. 3 
Everyday examples of social interactions serve to demonstrate that neat divisions may need 4 
to be replaced by a default expectation for complex relationships that involve integration 5 
between multiple systems (Zaki, 2013). 6 
A companion piece to rethinking terminology is to place explicit constraints on the 7 
generality of reported findings (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017). To do so, it is important to 8 
be explicit about the proposed limits, scope and range that the reported effects may have. 9 
Setting proposed boundary conditions on your findings makes it easier for others to attempt 10 
to generalise the findings or challenge and falsify them. For example, do you anticipate the 11 
reported effect to be restricted to a specific social context with a particular individual? Or is 12 
it a more general process that applies to the self in any future situation? Would you expect it 13 
to have obvious social consequences in real life or is the approach more of a demonstration 14 
that targets basic systems? Would you expect the effect to vary considerably across 15 
individuals or contexts? The process of placing clear and obvious constraints on generality 16 
helps to avoid researchers inadvertently mis-specifying a proposal and spending time 17 
needlessly using resources to test it. Placing explicit constraints on generality would be a 18 
valuable addition to clarify the scope and range of expectations regarding social top-down 19 
modulation.  20 
 21 
3.2 Make better use of developments in more established research programmes.  22 
 23 
More established research programmes and frameworks should be harvested much more 24 
for insight and guidance. We should not reinvent the wheel in a social guise. Well-studied 25 
and established frameworks can be particularly informative. For example, non-social top-26 
down control research in psychology (Theeuwes, 2004; 2010; Awh et al., 2012), 27 
neuroscience (Bar, 2003; Bar et al., 2006; Beck & Kastner, 2009), and neuropsychology 28 
(Humphreys, Riddoch, & Price, 1997) would seem sensible places to start. Elsewhere we 29 
have argued that research in social cognition would benefit from taking as strong a "non-30 
social" stance as possible (Ramsey & Ward, in press). 31 
 16 
Frameworks that go beyond top-down control can also be informative because social 1 
cognition is likely to rely, in part, on many of the same general processes that operate across 2 
all domains. For example, proposals from semantics, memory, motor control, and attention 3 
would be valuable in helping to guide expectations and the design of the research 4 
programme. This is especially true if one minimises the expectation for the role of 5 
specialised processes and instead emphasises more general-purpose mechanisms in social 6 
neuroscience (Spunt & Adolphs, 2017; Ramsey & Ward, in press).  7 
The semantic cognition literature, for example, supports a division between 8 
representation and control systems in understanding meaning (Jefferies, 2013; Lambon 9 
Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017). The representation system is associated with 10 
the acquisition and long-term storage of conceptual knowledge and relies on distributed 11 
sensory, motor and affective systems, plus a supramodal hub in the anterior temporal lobes. 12 
The control system utilises this semantic information in line with task- and context-specific 13 
requirements, thus making sure that relevant aspects of knowledge are retrieved and used 14 
at the appropriate time and place. The control system spans ventral and dorsolateral 15 
frontoparietal cortex, thus covering cortical territory predominantly associated with 16 
cognitive control and executive functions (Duncan, 2010; Peterson & Posner, 2012). A 17 
strength of this semantic cognition framework, as well as the key division between 18 
representation and control systems, is that they are based on a host of complementary 19 
approaches and levels of description, which span neuropsychology, computational 20 
modelling, neurostimulation, neuroimaging and comparative work (Chen et al., 2017; 21 
Jefferies, 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017).  22 
Translating this semantic framework into the social domain would entail specialised 23 
sensory processors for person features (representation), but general processors for 24 
controlling such social representations (Binney & Ramsey, 2020). Under this view, bias in the 25 
system (e.g., social modulation) can arise from representational and/or control systems and 26 
it is important to be clear which one you are measuring and researchers rarely, if ever, do 27 
this in cognitive psychology or neuroscience studies (including perception and action 28 
coupling). As reviewed recently (Campbell & Cunnington, 2017), this is particularly relevant 29 
for some perception and action links, which rely heavily on inferior frontal and parietal 30 
cortices, because these brain regions are implicated in both social processes (e.g., Rizzolatti 31 
& Sinigaglia, 2010) and domain-general attentional processes (e.g., Duncan, 2010). As such, 32 
 17 
on a brain network level of description, functional and anatomical specificity would need 1 
demonstrating. 2 
A further general framework to consider how to conceptualise social modulation is 3 
biased competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 1997; Beck & 4 
Kastner, 2009). Biased competition models offer a way to conceptualise how signals from 5 
different processing components may be integrated. Such frameworks characterise the brain 6 
as a complex information processor that has many specialised processors operating in 7 
parallel. For example, in the visual domain, there are dedicated processors for form, motion, 8 
colour, as well as complex feature combinations. Examples outside of the visual domain 9 
include processors largely dedicated to memory, planning, and a range of executive 10 
functions. Parallel processing systems of this sort present a computational problem, 11 
however, which concerns how signals are integrated across processors. Indeed, for coherent 12 
behaviour, the activity of different information processors and associated neural networks 13 
must be coordinated so that a single object or event guides response effectors at any one 14 
point in time. Behaviour would become disorganised and ineffective, for example, if goals, 15 
such as meeting a friend at the train station, could not integrate with other signals such as 16 
remembering which platform and at what time your friend is due to arrive. Likewise, 17 
behaviour would also breakdown if sensory signals, such as the sounds and visual inputs of 18 
trains arriving and departing, overwhelmed and interfered with other cognitive processes, 19 
such as your current goal to meet your friend. 20 
Biased competition frameworks solve the problem of signal integration by allowing 21 
bias for an object or event in one processor to propagate through the network until it 22 
resolves on a “winning” object or event. Such competition is meant to operate in ubiquitous 23 
fashion across the entire brain, and therefore would integrate neural activity within and 24 
between the neural networks associated with person representation and control processes. 25 
Within a biased competition framework, therefore, social modulation can be treated like any 26 
other form of bias, whether it takes a social or non-social form. Indeed, a given type of bias 27 
is not special in any sense, but instead just reflects another form of bias in the system. This 28 
offers the opportunity to integrate multiple signals – both social and non-social – without 29 
the need to worry about hard-to-define terms and possibly unrealistically strict divisions 30 
between concepts like “top-down” and “bottom-up”.  31 
 18 
Turning to another established literature, we consider how learning and memory 1 
systems can add to understanding social modulation. Given that memories and prior social 2 
experiences shape perceptions, it seems equally valuable to harness insight from memory 3 
research (Amodio, 2019). Amodio (2019) makes clear that social cognition research can 4 
benefit in numerous ways from considering the knowledge obtained about learning and 5 
memory systems across decades of research spanning multiple methods, as well as species, 6 
culminating in thousands of studies. For example, learning and memory research in cognitive 7 
neuroscience has identified several forms spanning episodic, semantic, instrumental and 8 
aversive conditioning, as well as habit. These forms of learning and memory rely on different 9 
neural networks and each one can link to multiple response channels (e.g., planning, 10 
impressions/judgments, affect, action and avoidance). Rather than largely ignoring this 11 
literature, it makes sense to exploit it in relation to social modulation research as it would 12 
appear to make clear, obvious and relevant predictions regarding different aspects of social 13 
cognition.  14 
In terms of demonstrating specificity of the claims being made, extensive solutions 15 
have been put forward by authors in another social domain (emotion perception from faces) 16 
that are extensive and not only relate to specificity, but reliability and generalisability 17 
(Barrett et al., 2019). A detailed description of the specific solutions proposed is beyond the 18 
scope of this article, but it remains clear that such guidance exists and the importance of not 19 
engaging with such issues is clear. In short, if older and more established research 20 
programmes could benefit from such proposals, it seems reasonable that principles of 21 
specificity (in multiple forms), reliability and generalisability are worth considering in relation 22 
to newer research programmes such as top-down modulation in perception-action coupling.  23 
Many other existing frameworks could also be of considerable value; here we just 24 
present a few illustrative examples of possible ways forward. The more general aim for the 25 
programme would be to avoid the danger of remaining encapsulated from these domains of 26 
human cognition and brain research, as they seem relevant on many levels and the 27 
differences may have been exaggerated in the past.  28 
 29 
3.3 Improve theoretical reasoning and embrace the credibility revolution. 30 
 31 
 19 
To alter the default position, researchers could seek alternatives to the null hypothesis. In 1 
the case of underlying systems, for example, researchers could probe the extent to which 2 
social modulation reflects bias between representational systems (e.g., different person 3 
representations biasing each other) or, alternatively, if it reflects a form of failure in control 4 
systems. Control systems allow cognition to maintain a task-relevant focus. Priming from 5 
irrelevant stimuli can therefore reflect a failure, perhaps a very mild failure, of control 6 
systems to maintain task-relevant activity.  As we hope is obvious, social modulation arising 7 
from an inability to exert complete task-relevant control would lead to a different type of 8 
interpretation regarding the functional value of the modulation when compared to 9 
modulation arising from bias in a person representation system such as face, body, affective 10 
or theory of mind representations.  11 
To illustrate how research questions can be moved on in this way, consider Bach and 12 
Tipper (2007), who found that visuomotor compatibility effects (e.g., the relative ease of 13 
pressing a foot-switch when responding to an image of a footballer as compared to an office 14 
worker) could influence social attributions. In their case, a stimulus person would be 15 
perceived as more athletic if associated with the footballer-footswitch stimulus-response 16 
pair. A question arising is, does this effect demonstrate a functional capacity, by which 17 
statistical associations in the environment are used to a maximum degree, or does this 18 
reflect some leakage, or failure of control, in properly insulating task-specific processing 19 
from irrelevant information? Tipper and Bach (2008) later investigated this further to find 20 
that in fact the effect is likely based on a failure of control, a misattribution of the self's 21 
visuomotor fluency to the actor. Of course, bias could operate in both representational and 22 
control systems as well as between these two systems. Addressing such theoretical 23 
positions, no matter what the outcome, would inform the type of mechanism underlying 24 
bias and give an insight into the functionally relevance and value.  25 
Another complementary approach to improving theoretical development would be 26 
to use tools that aid theory exposition. In order to clarify theoretical positions and aid 27 
cleaner and more efficient comparisons between perspectives, researchers could consider 28 
using the newly developed theory mapping tool (Gray, 2017; www.theorymaps.org). Theory 29 
mapping in this way enables researchers to express their theoretical position in a visual form 30 
using a common set of symbols. Given that the topic in question is complex, such an 31 
 20 
approach may be one way to help reduce mis-characterisation of other people’s positions 1 
and the subsequent testing of mis-specified alternative theories. 2 
If we change gear and consider the “credibility revolution” that is taking place in 3 
psychology (Vazire, 2018), much has been written about the issues associated with low 4 
reproducibility and the need to embrace methodological reform (Chambers, 2017; Simmons, 5 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Munafò et al., 2017; 6 
Ramsey, 2020). To enhance the quality of the evidence provided, researchers interested in 7 
how perception-action links can be biased by social signals need to raise the bar for what 8 
counts as convincing evidence for what top-down modulation is and why it is relevant. There 9 
have been many sensible suggestions put forward for how and why to embrace open science 10 
using more rigorous methods, which we encourage social modulation researchers to 11 
embrace (Chambers, 2017; Munafò et al., 2017; Vazire, 2018; Zwaan, Etz, Lucas, & 12 
Donnellan, 2017).  13 
Rather than repeat these very sensible prior suggestions, here we will focus on one 14 
specific issue that we see as particularly important for social modulation research, but which 15 
is likely to apply across the board in psychological science. Given that the anticipated effects 16 
are likely to be modest, a first basic aim would be to show that an effect is reliable, in the 17 
sense that it replicates with an acceptable degree of precision. Also, and of particular 18 
relevance to social top-down effects, it would make sense to consider the extent to which 19 
such effects have the potential to accumulate over time (Funder & Ozer, 2019). That is, the 20 
measurable effect (bias) produced by social signals (i.e., top-down modulation) in a one-off 21 
instance may be small, but if that is likely to be experienced 20 times a day, 5 days a week, 22 
then real-life effect and consequence may be different. For example, if you work alongside a 23 
colleague who you find attractive or you work in a cooperative/competitive context, the 24 
effects of each social episode may add up to something more than the one-off exchange. 25 
Not only that, such effects may only be measurable after longer exposure, which brings up 26 
questions about dose-response that also seem relevant. This of course would need to be 27 
demonstrated empirically with either longitudinal work or work that measures how effects 28 
modulate over time with repeat exposures to the same social modulation. It also reinforces 29 
the recent suggestion that basic research in brain science could benefit from engaging with 30 
research in real-world settings, so-called real-life neuroscience (Redcay & Schillbach, 2019; 31 
Shamay-Tsoory & Mendelsohn, 2019). 32 
 21 
 1 
4. Conclusion 2 
In conclusion, we argue that research aiming to understand how social factors modulate 3 
links between perception and action face several challenges that limit progress. To combat 4 
these challenges, we outline opportunities to reform the research programme. 5 
Opportunities include rethinking an overreliance on simplistic and unrealistic dichotomies 6 
(e.g., “top-down” vs. “bottom-up”), learning from more established research programmes, 7 
such as semantics, memory and attention, as well as embracing proposals for theoretical 8 
and methodological reform emanating from the “credibility revolution”. We feel that taking 9 
these opportunities seriously will provide a springboard for the emergence of a cumulative 10 
science of social modulation that can inform understanding of basic cognitive and brain 11 
systems, as well as real-life social interactions and the variety of abilities observed across the 12 
Autism Spectrum. 13 
  14 
 22 
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